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The markets for base metals have changed  higher metals prices.  This positive factor was
remarkably in the last few years.  A long period  largely offset by expected increases in metals
of extremely low prices was followed by a  production.  Much of the boom was attributable
sustained price boom in 1987-89  - which  to such transitory factors as changes in the
continued into 1990 for copper, nickel, lead, and  exchange rate, supply shocks, and low stocks.
zinc.
Depreciation of the U.S. dollar was the
What caused the price increases and what  dominant contributor to the price increases in the
they portend for the future are critically impor-  earlier part of the boom - particularly for
tant for developing countries heavily dependent  nickel, lead, and zinc. Changes in interest rates
on exports of those commodities.  were relatively unimportant.
Choe examines the causes of the price boom  *  Supply disturbances and low stocks signifi-
in terms of market fundamentals.  Because of the  cantly increased prices, particularly in 1988.
apparent importance of supply disturbances and  Low stocks have been a more important, consis-
low stocks, he developed a semistructural price  tent factor than supply disruptions.
equation to incorporate supply-side variables.
The resulting estimates fit better and explain  * Market fundamentals explain most of the
more than those in earlier studies. Estimation  price boom but a substantial component remains
and simulation results suggest that:  unexplained, suggesting that excessive specula-
tion ("bubbles") may have contributed to the
The growth of OECD industrial production  price increases, particularly for nickel in 1988.
was the most consistently important factor in the
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References  21I. INTRODUCTION
The  last  few  years  have  seen  remarkable  changes  in  the
markets for base metals. A long period of extremely low prices and
pervasive  demand  pessimism  has  been  followed by  strong  demand
growth  and  sharply  higher  prices. Most  base  metals  enjoyed  a
sustained  price  boom  over  the  1987-89  period;  the  boom  has
continued into 1990 for copper, nickel, lead, and zinc. The causes
of  these  changes  and  what  they  portend  for  the  future  are
critically important for a number of developing countries heavily
dependent on exports of these commodities.
Although much has been reported about the price  increases,
there has not been a systematic analysis of the various causes and
their relative importance. The main purpose of this paper  is to
evaluate quantitatively the impact  of the market fundamentals  that
contributed to the price boom. An interesting question is whether
the residual unexplained by the market fundamentals is large and
systematic enough to give credence to the presence of excessive
speculation  or a "bubble"  in the price boom, as often alluded to by
market analysts at times of major price increases.
The quantitative  evaluation  of  market fundamentals  is  based on
an extension of the reduced-form price equation model estimated by
Gilbert  (1986). The  extension  involves an  explicit  account  of
supply disturbances and low stocks along  the approach taken  by
Trivedi  (1990). A  model  similar to  that  used  by  Gilbert  and
Palaskas (1989) is used to estimate supply innovations. The price
equation is derived from an explicit model of demand, supply and
inventory holding under the assumption of rational expectations;
however, since only the price equation is estimated, the ration-l
expectations  constraints  on  the  parameters cannot  be imposed.  Thus,
the model  is consistent with most other alternative expectations
hypotheses.
In  the  next  section,  we  first  review  the  metals  market
developments during 1987-89. Initially, Gilbert's model is used in
section III to analyze the contribution to the price boom of the
market fundamentals included in his model. Section IV presents an
extension of Gilbert's model and the results of estimation; the
model is then used to simulate  the 1987-89  period. The last section
concludes the paper.
II. THE METALS PRICE BOOM OF 1987-89
The peiiod 1987-89 was remarkable for the metals markets in
several respects. Rarely before have metals prices been sustained
at high levels for such an extended period. It is also remarkable
in that the price increases followed  a long period of extremely low
2prices  and  widespread  pessimism  about  the  markets'  future.
Furthermore,  in  a  significant  departure  from  the  historical
pattern,  high  metals  prices  were  achieved  during  a  period  of
relatively modest economic growth.
Chart 1 shows the World Bank's index of base metal prices in
nominal and constant dollar terms. Chart 2 shows the nominal price
rovements for  the individual  metals.  The World Bank's  nominal price
index for the base metals increased  steadily  between 1986 and 1989;
the index reached a peak during the first quarter of 1989 at a
level more than 80% higher than in 1986.  The index started to
retreat from  the second  quarter of 1989, but picked up again during
the third quarter, because of increases in copper, tin, zinc and
lead prices. Between 1986 and the first quarter of 1989, nickel
prices increased by 359%,  copper prices by 137%, and zinc  prices by
149%. Aluminum prices peaked during the second quarter of 1988, at
a level 163% higher than in 1986, while tin prices were 64% higher
during the second quarter of 1989 than in 1986. Aluminum and tin
prices subsequently collapsed mainly due to increased supplies. An
all-time  high  for  lead  prices  was  reached during  March  1990;
nickel,  zinc,  lead, and  copper  prices  remained at high  levels
through mid-1990.
It should be noted that the earlier phase of the metals price
boom coincides with the period of substantial depreciation of the
US dollar, implying that the increases  were smaller in terms of the
currencies of other major industrial economies. For example, the
World  Bank's  metals  and  minerals  price  index  in  US  dollars
increased 46% between 1985 and 1988 but declined 22% in terms of
the Japanese yen.
In  broad and general  terms, the price increases  can be related
to the changes in market supplies and demand. Table 1 summarizes
the production, consumption  and stock data for  the 1980s.  Compared
with the first  half of the 1980s,  the most striking change  occurred
in the demand for metals. Metals consumption  growth in the market-
economy  countries  remained  in  the  doldrums during  the  1980-85
period,  giving  rise  to  highly  pessimistic  assessments  of  the
metals-mining  industry.  From  1986  onwards,  however,  metals
consumption started to show a clear departure from the earlier
1  Actually, the slowdown of the metals  consumption growth
rate in the market economies started earlier, from the mid-1970s.
The declines in metals consumption per unit of GDP in the major
industrial  courtries  over  the  1974-1985  period  prompted  the
"structural change" hypothesis.  This hypothesis suggested that the
low consumption growth rates were symptomatic of fundamental and
irreversible  declines in  the  metals intensity  of output,  presumably
due to substitution away from metals, changes in the output mix
into less  metal-intensive  products, and  technological innovations.
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4Table 1: World Production, consumption and Stocks of Base Metals
(Tin and Nickel in '00,000  MT; others in million MT)
----------------------------------------------------------------- __
1980  1982  1984  1986  1987  1988  1989
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Copper
Production  9.25  9.42  9.56  9.88  10.21  10.57  11.00
Consumption  9.39  9.04  9.94  10.08  10.44  10.63  10.74
Stocks  1.03  1.64  1.20  0.89  0.52  0.56  0.65
Aluminum
Production  16.06  1394  15.94  15.53  16.27  17.32  17.85
Consumption  15.29  14.23  15.57  16.04  16.99  17.74  17.50
Stocks  2.08  3.19  2.78  1.97  1.48  1.62  1.83
Tin
Production  2.32  2.16  2.25  2.04  2.03  2.23  2.27
Consumption  2.13  1.93  2.22  2.23  2.30  2.35  2.39
Stocks  0.39  0.47  0.50  0.80  0.61  0.50  0.56
Nickel
Production  7.50  6.23  7.37  7.53  7.93  8.38  8.67
Consumption  7.11  6.53  7.82  7.78  8.37  8.74  8.27
Stocks  2.04  2.02  1.47  1.23  0.89  0.83  0.94
Lead
Production  5.40  5.23  5.45  5.48  5.67  5.77  5.78
Consumption  5.41  5.25  5.50  5.51  5.61  5.67  5.70
Stocks  0.53  0.56  0.43  0.40  0.44  0.44  0.37
zinc
Production  6.17  5.98  6.65  6.80  7.05  7.25  7.39
Consumption  6.18  5.97  6.45  6.70  6.92  7.16  7.11
Stocks  0.79  0.80  0.63  0.62  0.57  0.52  0.55
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Stocks are year-end commercial stocks only. Tin commercial
stocks are estimated from total tin stocks and the buffer
stocks held by the International Tin Council.
Source: World Bureau of Metal Statistics; International Lead and
Zinc Study Group.
trends.  Consumption  growth  rates  during  the  1986-89  period
significantly  exceeded GNP growth  rates and the metals intensity of
GDP started to increase in the major industrial economies. Table 2
shows, for the G-7 industrial countries, the growth rates of GNP,
industrial production  (IP), and metals consumption. It has been
suggested  that a  vigorous expansion  of investment  and production of
metals-intensive  capital goods  has been the main  driving  force
behind the metals demard growth since 1987. Contrary to the first
5Table 2: Growth Rates of GDP, Industrial Production
and Metals Consumption of G-7 Countries
(percent  per annum)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GDP  IP  MQ  MQ/GDP  MQ/IP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (3-1)  (3-2)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1981  1.81  0.56  -3.04  -4.85  -3.60
1982  -0.78  -0.49  -6.84  -6.06  -6.35
1983  3.03  3.80  6.59  3.56  2.79
1984  5.34  8.10  6.79  1.45  -1.31
1985  3.41  2.67  -2.55  -5.96  -5.22
1986  2.70  1.10  0.80  -1.90  -0.30
1987  3.60  3.26  4.72  1.12  1.46
1988  4.51  6.01  5.06  0.55  -0.95
1989  3.42  3.42  -0.04  -3.46  -3.46
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Note: MQ is the rate of change of the Divisia index of base metals
consumption.
Source: OECD; and International Economics Department, World Bank.
half  of the 1980s, the  industrial sector growth  during  1988-89
exceeded that of the economy as a whole. When metals consumption
per unit of  GDP or per  unit of  industrial  production (metals
intensity)  is  computed  for  these  countries,  N  observe  that
increases and declines are less pronounced in tei. 1...  of industrial
production than in  terms of  GDP. The metals intensity of industrial
production has not shown a significant increase during the 1987-89
period. In other words, much of the increase in  metals consumption
in  1988  and  1989  is explained  by  the  expansion  in  indvstrial
production relative to GNP. It is believed that low energy prices
and the  large pent-up demand  for investment were the  important
factors behind the robust investment activities in the second half
of the 1980s.
Events on the supply side made a sianificant contribution to
the price rise in two important ways --  through a reluctance to
reactivate  idled  capacities,  and  supply  disruptions.  Recent
estimates indicate  that the percentage  production increases in 1987
and 1988 were  substantial, but were less than expected capacity
increases. In 1988, for example, the market economies' copper  mine
capacity  increased by more  than  200,000 tons,  but  actual mine
production slightly declined. Short-term supply responses to the
higher  prices  have  been  hardly  noticeable  in  many  developing
countries.  An  exception  may  be  tin,  which  experienced  sharp
production increases in 1988 when prices started to rise, much of
it through reactivation of idled capacities. For  other metals,
however,  most  of  the  production  increases originated  from  new
additions to capacity that had been in the pipeline for some time.
6During  the period of low prices, rationalization and restructuring
led to a large reduction of production capacity; the adjustment
process  was more  or  less completed  by  1986.  When  the  prices
increased, most of the idled capacity was not reactivated because
of high start-up costs and the widespread expectation  that the high
prices would not last very long.
In  the last several  years, the  metals-mining industry  has been
beset by unusually frequent  and large  supply disruptions of  various
kinds. It is  most unfortunate  that many of the developing countries
were  unable  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  high  metals  prices
because of labor disputes, political and social  unrest, natural and
man-made disasters, and lack of efficient management. Hardest hit
were Peru  (copper, lead and zinc), Papua New Guinea, and Zambia
(copper). Supply  problems of  less  severity also  took  place  in
Mexico (copper),  Canada (copper,  nickel, lead and zinc), Chile and
Zaire (copper).  These disruptions  probably more than wiped out the
gains  in production through enhanced capacity utilization which
occurred mostly  in the industrial countries, such as the United
States.
III. GILBERT'S INDEX MODEL
As a preliminary, we employ in this section Gilbert's (1986)
market-fundamentals model of the metals price index to explain the
metals price boom of 1987-89. Gilbert estimated a quarterly model
of the World Bank's commodity price indices, one of which is the
metals and minerals index shown in Chart 1. Under the assumption
that metals markets are efficient, Gilbert derives a reduced-form
equation for commodity prices wherein exchange rate changes and
developing  courtry debt  play a  key role. The  estimated model
expresses changes in  the logarithm  of the metals and minerals price
index in nominal US dollars as a function of its own lagged values
and changes in the interest rate, inflation index,  OECD industrial
production, oil prices, exchange rates, and the debt service of
developing countries. Since this is a  short-term model, sxupplies  of
commodities are assumed to be constant and therefore do not appear
in the equation.
Gilbert's  index model  for metals  and  minerals  is used  to
simulate the  1987-89 period. Simulation starts  from the  fourth
quarter of 1986. Table 3  attributes the changes in the metals index
to the various  market fundamentals  using the simulation results. It
is seen that Gilbert's model overestimates the actual index for
1987 and  underestimates  for 1988 and  1989; t.ie  forecast error
widens as time passes, to as much as 14.3% of the actual level of
the  index for the  final quarter of 1989. The  lagged effect  of
changes  in the  exogenous variables  that  took  place  before  the
fourth quarter of 1986 is shown to be large initially in 1987 but
7quickly vanishes subsequently. One reason for the overesti  aation
for 1987 could be the model's inability to take account of the
relatively large stocks  carried over from the  preceding year, while
the underestimation for 1988-89 could be attributed to the failure
to account for the supply disruptions discussed in the previous
section.
Table 3: Decomposition of Price Boom with Gilbert's Model
(percent change from 1986 fourth quarter)
…_____________.__________________________________________________
1987  1988  1989
…----------------------------------------------------------------
Industrial Production  3.1  13.0  17.7
Exchange Rate  7.3  17.3  11.8
Interest Rate  -0.5  -0.5  -0.4
Oil Price  0.0  1.2  3.0
Interaction Effect*  0.3  -1.8  -2.1
Lagged Effect  20.2  11.3  5.4
Total Explained  29.8  40.5  35.4
Unexplained Residual  -13.4  19.4  31.7
Actual Change  16.4  59.9  67.1
…--  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
*  Interaction effect arises due to the simultaneity between the
market fundamentals included in the model.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
Industrial  production and exchange rate  changes appear  to  have
been the most significant factors that contributed to the metals
price  boom.  The  US  dollar  depreciated  against  other  major
currencies through much  of the  19io6-1988  period,  only  to  turn
around  and  appreciate  mildly  from  mid-1988.  Gilbert's  model
estimates  that this  depreciation gave  a  major  boost  to metals
prices in 1987 and 1988 by increasing demand and reducing supply
outside the  United States, and that its  effect continued into 1989.
OECD industrial  production growth is seen as the main driving force
behind the price boom, but its impact in 1987 and 1988 was smaller
than that of the exchange rate adjustments.
Changes in short-term interest rates and petroleum prices are
seen as having been relatively unimportant factors in the metals
price  boom.  Over  the  1987-89  period,  interest  rates  slowly
increased but remained relatively low by recent standards. Thus,
its negative  impact on metals  prices is seen to have been only
minor.  Petroleum  prices  declined  in  1986,  increased  in  1987,
declined again in 1988 but increased in 1989. The small positive
impact  in  1988  and  1989 reflects  the  delayed  impact of  these
changes on metals prices.
8overall,  Gilbert's index  model produces forecast  errors in  the
range of 11-19% of the actual level of the index. It seems likely
that the large unexplained residuals resulted from the omission of
supply  disturbances  and  low  stocks,  because  the  model
underestimates  for  both  1988  and  1989 when  such  factors  were
important.
IV.  EXTENSIONS: SUPPLY DISRUPTIONS AND STOCKS
A. The Model
In order to assess the role of the supply side impact on the
1987-89  metals  price  boom,  we  develop  a  simple  model  of  a
representative metal market  along  the lines of Muth  (1961) and
Trivedi (1990):
Qt=  C  Pt  +  ,X  4,  Ult  (1)
t=-  Pt  +  72  X2t  +  U2t  (2)
It  6  (P  t+1  Pt  - r.)  +  p  Dt  (3)
it = It1 - Dt + Qt(4)
where  Pt is the price of the metal  in period t  and Pet+j  is the
expected price in  t+l conditional  on information  available in  t. As
in Trivedi,  the  Muthian  supply  (Q) and demand  (D) models  are
extended to include exogenous shift variables (X 1 and X2). However,
unlike agricultural commodities dealt with by Muth and Trivedi,
metals  production depends  on the current  rather than expected next-
period prices. Inventory demand  (I, consists of speculative and
transactions  components;  the  speculative  demand  is  a  linear
function of the expected price change minus the interest (r) cost
of  stock  holding, while  tle  transactions demand  is  a  constant
fraction of current demand.  It is assumed that inventory demand
will  always  be  met  and  that  stocks  are  sufficiently  large  to
2  This could be a  costly simplification.  The supply-of-storage
literature has explained  the transactions  demand for inventories  in
terms of convenience yiel  I and the cost of holding  inventories
(storage and interest cos s). Over the  1980s, the drive  to cut
costs led to increasing adaptation of just-in/just-out inventory
management,  which  implies lower convenience yield  from a  given
level of stocks than before.
9prevent stock-outs. 3 The supply  and demand  disturbances, u  Is,  are
assumed to  be white-noise processes.  All variables are  exnressed in
logarithms  of  the  original  values.  Metals  prices  are  in  real
dollars; they are deflated with the US wholesale price index.
Combining (1)-(4)  and solving for Pt  yields:
Pt  =  A  Pt.,  +  1  Pet, 1 - n1  Pt  +  Wt,  (5)
where
m7  =6/m,
wt  =  m 1 (A (r,-rt 1 )+711X1 t-t71 2[X2t-lM(X2t-X2t-1)  I
+UIt-U2t-1A  (U2t  U2t-0 
Suppose that the quadratic formn:
77  e - (l+n)  6 + A  =  0,  (6)
has cwo  real roots 0, and 02  such that e 1<1  and 02>1.  Further assume
tvat the process defined by:
Goo
Vt =  (1-,7e,)  E  e 2' E(wt+j|Ift),  (7)
i=O
is  a realizable stationary process,  where nt  is the information set
available in t. Then,  Pesaran  (1987) has showi.  that the unique
reduced-form forward solution of (5) is given by:
Pt =1  Pt- 1 + vt  - (1/e2)  E(vtlnt- 1)  . (8)
The conventional  method  of  deriving  estimable  price equations
from (8)  is  to assume stochastic  processes generating X1, X 2 and the
interest rate.  With more general forms of stochastic processes,
the reduced-form price equation takes the form:
Pt  =  61  Pt1  +  f(current and past values of X 1, X 2,  rt,  etc.),  (9)
where  f{.)  is  a  linear  function  of  the  relevant  market
fundamentals.
3  For versions of the model with stocks  constrained to be non-
negative, see  Miranda and Helmberger (1988),  and Deaton and Laroque
(1989).
10To  investigate the  effects of  supply  disruptions  and  low
stocks, we  use  a  combination of  different  approaches taken  by
Trivedi  and  by  Gilbert  and  Palaskas.  Instead  of  estimating  a
structural  reduced-form  price equation  such as (8),  Trivedi derives
a  "semi-structural"  price  equation  from  the  inventory  demand
equation so  that current  prices are not depencent on current supply
and  demand.  Unlike  Trivedi,  we  impose  current-period  market
clearing, given  the level of  inventories carried over  from the
previous period. Thus, combining (l)-(4)  under the assumption that
It1 is given, and solving for Pt:
tmpe  _  I  (t- I  +  yt),  (10)
where  yt  =  Art+f7lX 1 -v1 2 (l+U)X 2,+u 1,-(l+/&)u 2,.
Taking  the  conditional  expectation  of  P,+ in  (8)  given  n.,  we
get:
pet+l  =  J1  Pt  +  (l-1/82)  E(vl, 1 Int)*  (11)
The expression in (11)  is  used  to rewrite (10), to get:
Pt  =  n  {It-1  +  yt +  f  6(1-02)/02]  E(v,+Ilnt)),  (12)
where  n =  601  - m.
Equation (12)  is  a semi-structural  price eauation more general
than  that  of  Trivedi's  in  that  the  current  market  price  is
determined by current supply and demand and expectations of future
market  fundamentals; and given the stocks carried over from the
last  period.  Thus,  the  forecast errors  of  the  stock  behavior
equation in (4)  do not cumulate, i.e., the model assumes that the
market observes ex post the errors in forecasting stock behavior
and makes decisions on the  basis of thdt information.  Although this
makes the model not fully dynamic, it  has  the  advantage  of  better
explaining historical data  than  (8) because stock  behavior has
proven to be notoriously unstable and stock carryovers are a part
of the information set in determining the current market price.
The price  equation  (12) states  that the  current price  is
determined by stock carryovers, current and expected realizations
of market fundamentals, and supply and demand disturbances. As in
(9), the estimable version of (12)  would include the current and
lagged observations of structural variables and disturbances. To
measure the effects of supply disruptions, we first estimate the
expected and unexpected components of supply movements. Following
Gilbert and Palaskas, we postulate that capacity expansions and
hence production increases respond  to prices with some lags. Then,
the first difference of production may be expressed as:
DQt =  f(DPt, MADPt.m,  MADPtn),  (13)
11where D is the first-difference operator, MADPt is the three-year
moving average of price changes, and m and n are the medium- and
long-term investment gestation lags, respectively. Residuals frqm
regression of (13)  are used as a proxy for supply disturbances (Q)
in estimation of (12).
On the demand side, the structural variables and disturbances
are  included  in the  price  equation directly.  The  demand-shift
variable is represented by the index of OECD industrial production
(IP;. The error term in the econormetric  estimation model of (12)
consists  of  the  current-period demand  disturbances  as  well  as
errors of observation.
Finally, the semi-structural price equation to be estimated,
expressed in the first-difference form, may be written as:
DPt  =  f(DIPt,  DQt, DIt. 1, DEX, Dr),  (14)
where f{.} is a linear function and DEX represents exchange rate
changes. Exchange rate changes  have been recognized as an important
supply and demand  shift  factor at the national level. Problems
relating to their inclusion in a global aggregate model as in (14)
are discussed in Gilbert (1989).
B. Results
The  results  of  estimating  (14) are  reported  in  Table  4.
Related estimates of the supply equation in (13) are shown in an
annex to this paper. First note in Table 4 that the Durbin-Watson
statistics indicate  no serial  correlation  problem in  the estimates,
except for zinc. Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the
zinc equation, as would be the case with the reduced-form price
equation  in  (8), does  not  improve the  Durbin-Watson  statistic
appreciably. This  result  suggests that  the  presence  of  lagged
prices  as  an  explanatory  variable  implied  by  the  rationil
expectations solution of the model is not supported by the data.
4  Since DPt  is an endogenous variable, it may be necessary to
use a simultaneous equation technique to estimate (13).
5  Estimates with the lagged price variable, either in first
differences  or  in  levels,  show  that  its  coefficient  is
statistically  insignificant  or,  when  it  is  significant,  the
coefficient of IP is not significant. Thus, the results indicate
that the lagged price variable probably should not appear in the
price equation.
12Table  4: Estimates  of Metals  Price  Equation
(Dependent  Variable:  DPt)
Indep.
Variables  Copper  Aluminum  Tin  Nickel  Lead  Zinc
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Intercept  -0.131  -0.148  -0.059  -0.057  -0.118  -0.175
(3.56)  (4.16)  (1.20)  (1.07)  (3.01)  (4.46)
DIPt  3.703  3.846  1.308  1.929  2.795  5.450
(5.00)  (5.14)  (1.30)  (1.75)  (3.29)  (6.17)
DQt  -1.390  -2.817  -0.913  -0.925  -2.934  -4.408
(1.47)  (4.59)  (1.20)  (1.66)  (2.29)  (5.22)
DIt-1  -0.294  -0.581  -0.378  -0.279  -0.787  -0.683
(3.42)  4.36)  (1.58)  (2.41)  (4.19)  (4.65)
MADEX  -0.710  -0.589  -0.269a  -1.542a  -1.238  -0.496'
(1.62)  (1.39)  (0.52)  (2.79)  (2.68)  (1.44)
DTBR  -0.008  -0.013  0.024  -0.037  0.004  -0.020
(0.43)  (0.74)  (0.90)  (1.34)  (0.23)  (1.04)
R2  0.746  0.765  0.306  0.425  0.762  0.812
D-W  2.160  1.667  2.185  2.329  2.295  1.181
s.e.  0.131  0.116  0.172  0.186  0.133  0.115
s.d.(DPt)  0.233  0.214  0.186  0.221  0.245  0.239
-----------------------------------------------------------------
a  one-year  lagged  values  are used  instead  of moving  averages.
Notes:  Absolute  values  of t-ratios  are  in parentheses.
MADEX:  Two-year  moving  average  of the  logarithmic  rate  of
change of the GDP-weighted  exchange  rate index of G-7
countries'  currencies  per US dollar.
DTBR:  Change  in the  three-month  US Treasury  bill  rate.
Source:  International  Economics  Department,  World  Bank.
Overall,  the goodness-of-fit  statistics  are exceptionally  good
compared  with  earlier  estimates  of  similar  equations.  R  values
have been usually  in the range  of 0.4-0.6  in previous  estimates  of
first-difference  price  equations,  compared  with  0.75-0.81  here
13except for tin and nickel.6  All of the parameter estimates have
the expected signs except those on the interest rate (represented
by the three-month US Treasury bill rate (TBR)) for tin and lead.
Generally,  the  estimated  coefficients  for  DTBR  are  small  and
insignificant, probably because the interest rate does not capture
forward-looking inventory behavior well. This makes sense because
the  interest  cost  of  holding  stocks  is  probably  not  a  major
consideration in speculative decisions.
Exchange rate changes appear  to  have been a significant factor
in determining metals prices, particularly for nickel and lead.
Their impact is less than immediate, however, because of the time
required  to work its  way through supply  and demand; two-year  moving
averages or one-year lagged  exchange rate changes  explain the price
movements  better  than  current-year  values.  Estimates  of  the
exchange rate impact may be understated because the data period
covers the 1960s when the fixed exchange rate regime was in place.
Estimates of the demand and supply shift parameters and the
intercept term are highly significant,  with exceptions for tin and
nickel. The intercept term shows the rate of change of constant-
dollar metals prices if none of the explanatory variables change;
for example, the copper price will decline by 13.1% if industrial
production,  stocks,  exchange  rates  and  interest  rates  remain
constant and copper production changes as anticipated. Thus, in a
long-term steady state when stocks, exchange rates and interest
rates remain constant  and industrial  production grows at a  constant
rate of, say, 3% annually, and there are no surprises in the rate
of copper  production growth,  the real  copper price would decline by
about  2%  annually  (-0.131+3.703x0.03=-0.0199). Note  that  the
surprise-fre$  growth rate of copper  production is  estimated at 2.8%
(see annex).  Thus,  as  shown  in Table  5, the  growth  rate  of
industrial production should exceed that of copper production by
about 0.7% in order to maintain a constant real price of copper.
The differentials shown in Table 5 indicate the degree of demand
response  to  industrial  production  growth  over  the  estimation
period, and could change as this relationship changes over time.
Supply innovations and stock changes have a strong impact on
prices,  particularly  for  zinc,  aluminum  and  lead.  Greater
6  Note that both tin and nickel prices have been extremely
volatile in  recent  years, because,  respectively,  of the collapse of
the International  Tin Council and the instability of USSR exports,
among other reasons.
During the 1963-89 period, OECD industrial production grew
at 3.8% and the real copper  price increased  by 0.8% annually, which
is what the equation predicts.
14Table 5: Long-Term Relationship Between
Metals Prices and Quantities
Copper  Aluminum  Tin  Nickel  Lead  Zinc
IP Growth
Rate"  3.54  3.85  4.51  2.95  4.22  3.21
Metals Supply
Growth Rate  2.80  4.80  0.75  2.79  2.49  2.59
Differen-
tial  0.74  -0.95  3.76  -0.16  1.73  0.62
_________-______________________________________________________
aOECD  industrial production growth rates are the rates necessary
to maintain constant real prices of the metals under the
surprise-free  metals production growth rates shown in the second
row.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
sensitivity of prices to supply  disruptions could be an indication
of  a  smaller  elasticity  of  substitution between  the  metal  in
question and other inputs. It has not, however, been shown that
aluminum, lead and zinc have a smaller price elasticity of demand
than copper, tin and nickel.
We now turn to analyzing the 1987-89 metals price boom using
the estimated price equations. In order to decompose the actual
price changes into those caused by different market fundamentals,
the 1987-89 period is forecast under the assumption that various
subsets of the explanatory variables did not change, by setting
them equal to zero. The results of such computation are shown in
Table 6. If none of the market fundamentals changed, then prices
would  have  declined by  the amount  indicated by  the  intercepts
(shown  under  Exp.  DQt). The  differences  between  actual  price
changes and the intercepts  are, therefore, the total price changes
that need to be explained.
As expected, the largest and most consistent contributor to
the 1987-89 price  increase was the increase  in OECD  industrial
production.  However, the  price-boosting  effect  of  higher industrial
production was roughly equivalent in absolute terms to the price-
depressing effect of the expected increases in metals production
(Exp. DQt). So, in a sense, the price  increases resulted mostly
from changes in the market fundamentals that are beyond the realm
of normal supply and demand developments, and thus are basically
transitory in nature.
15Table 6: Accounting for the 1987-89 Price Boom
(1987-89  average percent change)
------------------------------------------------------------- __--
Funda-
mentals  Copper  Aluminum  Tin  Nickel  Lead  Zinc
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DIPt  15.6  16.2  5.5  8.1  11.7  22.9
DQt  1.7  4.5  -2.4  2.1  0.4  7.7
DIt-I  6.4  8.0  4.4  4.1  2.4  3.6
MADEX  5.8  4.9  3.7  21.3  10.2  6.8
DTBR  -0.6  -0.9  1.7  -2.7  0.3  -1.4
Unexplained  4.9  -5.5  0.1  10.2  -0.1  0.4
Total above  33.7  27.1  13.0  43.0  24.9  40.0
Exp. DQ,  -13.1  -14.8  -5.9  -5.7  -11.8  -17.5
Actual DP,  20.6  12.3  7.1  37.3  13.1  22.5
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: The numbers shown in the first five rows are the estimated
percentage price changes that resulted from changes in each
market fundamental. "Unexplained" is the percentage change
unaccounted for by market fundamentals. Price changes that
are explained by expected changes in supplies are shown
under "Exp. DQti".
Source: Tnternational Economics Department, World Bank.
In particular, the supply disruptions alluded to earlier and
the low level of beginning stocks played major roles in the price
run-up. Interestingly, the  impact of low stocks  is shown to be
relatively large and  positive. However,  the supply  disturbances  had
a relatively small though significantly positive impact on price
increases  except for  tin, for  which production increased sharply in
the latter part of the period.
The  smallness  of  the  estimated  contribution  of  supply
innovations comes as a surprise in view  of the many publicized
incidence of supply disruptions driving up prices. One possible
explanation for this may be that supply  disruptions often turn out
to be not  as serious as  initially reported and usually  do not
visibly affect  the ex-post  world production figures.  This aspect of
the impact  of supply  disruptions  will not be captured  by the supply
innovation  variable,  but  rather  will  be  relegated  to  the
unexplained residual.
16Exchange rate changes had a large positive impact on metals
prices, but that of interest rate changes were mixed, small and
insignificant for most metals. This result is consistent with that
of Gilbert  (1986). The smaller the US share of world trade, the
larger the impact of exchange rate changes on metals prices. It is
seen from Table 6 that nickel, lead and possibly zinc experienced
a larger exchange rate impact  than the other metals. The US shares
of these three metals in  world trade are not small, but most of it
consists  of  US  imports  from  Canada,  which  probably  did  not
significantly affect  prices in  the rest-of-the-world  trade in  these
metals.
Incorporation  of  the supply  side factors  substantially  reduces
the unexplained component and the bulk of the 1987-89 price boom
can be accounted for by changes in market fundamentals. However,
the unexplained residual is still considerable. It is  particularly
large  for nickel, which  experienced the wildest price  upswings
during  the  period.  Thus,  the  nickel  price  episode  certainly
deserves an investigation  of  whether excessive  speculation or  price
bubble was an important contributing factor. Aluminum and copper
also  show  sizable  unexplained  components.  Year  to  year  the
unexplained component was also significant for tin, lead, and zinc
(see Table 7). This raises the question of whether bubbles were
present  in  these  prices  as  well.  One  cannot  rule  out  the
possibility of bubbles forming  and bursting several  times for these
metals,  if  not  being  sustained  over  an  extended  period  as
presumably  could have been the case  for nickel. A  particularly
illuminating  example  is  the  case  of  copper  that  on  several
occasions during the boom period had sharp rallies on the news of
supply  disruptions  or  reduced  exchange  stocks  and  subsequent
declines when stocks started to increase.
To see how the various market  fundamentals affected metals
prices  over  time,  Table  7  presents  the  average  percentage
contributions by year, where the averages are simple arithmetic
averages over the metals. OECD industrial production growth (DIPd)
was  a  consistently important positive contributor to  the price
boom,  more  so  in  1988  than  in  the  other  two  years.  This  is
explained  by  higher  OECD  industrial production  growth  in  1988
(5.7%)  than in 1987  and 1989  (3.1%  and 3.8%,  respectively). Also,
supply disruptions and low stocks figured  more importantly in 1988
than in 1987  and 1989.  Stocks (DIt 1) at the beginning of 1988  were
lower than in the other two years for aluminum, copper, and lead;
they were lowest at the beginning of 1989  for  nickel and tin,  while
for zinc there was little change during 1988  (see  Table 1). It is
difficult to relate the estimated effects of supply disruptions to
actual  incidents.  It  is widely  believed,  however,  that  major
disruptions  in nickel, aluminum, lead and zinc, and copper were
responsible for steep price increases in 1988.
17Table 7: The Contribution of Market Fundamentals
over the 1987-89 Metals Price Boom
(average  percent change)
------------------------------------------------------------- __--
Funda-
mentals  1987  1988  1989
DIPt  9.9  18.0  12.1
DQt  1.6  4.0  1.3
DIt1I  4.5  8.2  1.6
MADEX  18.2  7.8  0.4
DTBR  0.1  -0.7  -1.2
Unexplained  -4.5  11.3  -1.9
Total above  29.8  48.6  12.3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
The impact of exchange rate changes (MADEX)  closely match the
movement of the US dollar  vis-a-vis other  major currencies --  i.e.,
depreciation up to about mid-1988 and then gradual appreciation.
Thus, the lagged impact on metals prices almost vanishes by the
middle of 1989. The US dollar depreciation in 1986-87 apparently
was the dominant cause of the metals price increase in 1987. It
still  had a  fairly strong  impact  in  1988. This  result  broadly
agrees with that of Gilbert (1986).  As expected, increases in US
interest rates  (DTBR) from  1988 are  seen to have  had  negative
impact  on  metals  prices.  Their  importance,  however,  has  been
marginal.
If excessive speculation  or a price bubble was a factor in the
1987-89 metals price boom,  it was probably most concentrated in
1988 --as seen by the unexplained component in that year. It is
interesting  to note that the time of a likely  price bubble was also
the period of most supply disturbances and low stocks. This would
suggest that sudden changes in certain market fundamentals could
trigger  the  onset  of  bubbles.  This  and  other  aspects  of  the
unexplained  component of metals  price movements will be the subject
of future research.
18V. CONCLUSIONS
The 1987-89 metals price boom is unique  in that it has been
sustained for more than three years --  the longest in the post-war
period --  and still continues for copper, nickel, lead and zinc.
This paper examines the causes of the boom from the point of view
of market  'undamentals.  Because of the  apparent  importance of
supply  disturbances and low  stocks,  the reduced-form  price equation
specificat'ion  was extended to incorporate supply-side variables.
The  resu'ting  estimates  exhibit  superior  fit  and  greater
explanatory power  than,  for example, those  of Gilbert's  (1986)
model.  The estimates  of the model  and simulations  of the  boom
period with the model suggest the following observations:
(a)  The growth of OECD industrial production was the most
consistently important factor in the higher metals prices. This
positive influence was largely offset by anticipated increases in
metals production. Thus, in a sense the metals price boom resulted
mostly from changes in  other market fundamentals  --  namely, supply
disruptions, low stocks, and US dollar  depreciation --  factors
which are transitory in nature. The boom will cease, as it already
has for aluminum and tin, once these transitory factors disappear.
(b)  US dollar depreciation was the dominant contributor to
the metals price increase during the earlier part of the boom and
particularly for nickel, lead and zinc. Changes in US  interest
rates were found to have been relatively unimportant.
(c)  Supply  disturbances and  low stocks  had  significantly
positive impacts on the price increases,  particularly in 1988. Low
stocks have been a more important and more consistent cause than
supply disruptions. The modest contribution of supply  shocks is
surprising in view of the publicity given to them.
(d)  Although market fundamentals as specified here explain
most  of the  price  boom  --  much  more  so than  in earlier  studies  --
the unexplained component is still considerable, suggesting that
excessive speculation or bubbles oxacerbated the price increases.
The presence of bubbles was most likely for nickel in 1988. Also,
bubbles could  have been closely associated  with supply  disruptions.
19ANNEX
A linear form of the metals supply equation in equation (13)
was estimated, i.e.,
DQt  =  a0 +  a1 DPt +  a2 MADPt.m +  a3 MADPt-n  (14)
where  m=2 or 3, and n=5 or 6, depending on estimation results.
Results of estimation are shown in  Annex Table 1.
The  intercept  term  measures  the  surprise-free  production
growth rate; estimates of this growth rate are remarkably similar
for copper, nickel, lead and zinc, while aluminum and tin represent
the two  extremes. The  short-term price  elasticity of supply  is
measured  by  a 1,  for  which  the  estimates  are  reasonably  close
together, except for tin. The lagged  response of capacity to prices
is not obvious from the estimates for most metals;  for tin and
zinc,  the  lagged  moving  average  prices  are  dropped  from  the
equation because of  highly insignificant  estimates  often with wrong
signs.  The goodness-of-fit statistics are generally poor; however,
there  is no  strong  indication that the  supply  innovations  are
serially correlated.
Annex Table 1: Estimates of Supply Equation
------------------------------------------------------------- __--
Para-
meters  Copper  Al;ninum  Tin  Nickel  Lead  Zinc
ao  0.028  0.048  0.008  0.028  0.025  0.026
(4.90)  (4.59)  (0.81)  (1.76)  (4.86)  (3.54)
ai  0.116  0.117  0.032  0.133  0.109  0.085
(4.54)  (2.20)  (0.62)  (1.57)  (4.98)  (2.74)
a 2 0.094  0.007  0.021  0.091
(1.84)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (2.36)
a 3 0.040  0.0004  0.059  0.045
(0.83)  (0.002)  (0.19)  (1.14)
R  0.476  0.195  0.014  0.109  0.534  0.224
D-W  2.482  1.170  2.129  2.327  1.943  1.946
s.e.  0.030  0.053  0.049  0.082  0.026  0.038
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: m=2 and n=5 for nickel and copper; and m=3 and n=6 for
aluminum and lead.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
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